Jacqueline Jones. A Dreadful Deceit. The Myth of Race from the Colonial Era to Obama's America. New York: Basic Books, 2013.
I]
        This book is the perfect gift for that hard-to-disarm bigot  on your list who can’t grasp the idea that race is a construct. Note that I  said construct, not social  construct, because the author does not fully  grasp what a social  construct is. Her book's a series of interesting vignettes about interesting Americans, ranging from the  prosecution in 1656 of a Maryland planter for the torture and murder of a black  slave in which  the fact that the victim was black didn't come up,  to a black Trotskyite union organizer in Detroit in the ‘seventies who refused  to be drawn into  race-baiting and divisiveness. The author concludes that the  concept of race has been used throughout American History as a “partisan  political weapon,” a tool of “political and economic opportunism,” and so forth; and  that if we wouldn’t so “worship the market” all would be fine; she sounds  like an undergraduate doing the Occupy.
      
      II]
    And, as with Occupy, it’s not the talk itself that’s  problematic, it’s what’s absent from it. In her first vignette Jones points out  that the murdered slave Antonio was vulnerable, not because he was black but  because he was known not to belong to a kindred group, nation or tribe that could offer protection or exact revenge: 
Justifications for slavery remained fluid, and […] neither legal authorities nor planters were deploying the notion of racial differences as a rationale for the subordination of black people.
There’s a fundamental methodological flaw in this argument: the fact that such notions were not deployed as rationalizations does not mean they weren’t present in some fashion. Jones is one of those self-protective progressives who’d like to believe the only racist behavior is the behavior that’s overtly, consciously racial: “Most Chesapeake planters were neither ideologues nor idealists; they were entrepreneurs bent on making money.” (Being bent on making money is not an ideology? Who knew?) Since she can’t manage to locate an articulated theory of race in ideologies she places responsibility for Antonio's death, by default, on "entrepreneurship:" filthy lucre. By deploying the old argumentum ex silentio, Jones sidesteps the obvious: that racism is a function of social practices that need not be articulated because they are social practices. As Etienne Balibar once observed, there is no esoteric racism: racial theorizing is invariably an incarnation of social norms or projected social norms, and not the other way around. And it’s the resiliency of racism as a protean social dynamic that Jones at once illustrates, and refuses to acknowledge: whatever mild demurrals she may make, racism to her is not something anchored in social practice; in the typical fashion of the positivist she anchors it on one side in an idealistic, near-metaphysical definition of what racism is, and on the other in the will of the individual actor: Personal Responsibility in Racial Discrimination.

III]
      The most revealing silence in this book, however, is not  about the construction of racism, it’s about the construction of white identity. There’s a very strong argument  that racism is not constructed by defining from the outside what it means to be  black but by defining from the inside what it means to be white, a definition  that serves to exclude the Other without ever defining Otherness except as lack:  it’s called norming out. In America the construction of race is inseparable  from the construction of Whiteness as a norm. Jones gives a perfect example of  this when she discusses a statement that the slave Antonio behaved like a “wild  man.” Triumphantly she argues that since the Wild Man in European lore was  not associated with people of African descent there was no racial  stigmatization implied. Then she goes on to explain that there was little  difference in the kinds of labor assigned to enslaved Africans and indentured Englishmen,  except that the customary rights of Englishmen were usually observed, and a  master who killed his English servant would almost surely hang. By suggesting  that Antonio was a “wild man,” his master was arguing the very specific  point that his slave was not a “civilized man,” i.e. not white: beyond the Pale, if you'll forgive the pun. Antonio had no  rights that any white man was bound to respect. To this Jones adds, that when the  blurring of the line between Englishness and being black became too great  because of the many children of mixed parentage, the Virginia Legislature determined  that any child born of mixed parentage had the legal rights of the mother,  which in the case of black women meant the right to be raped for the  reproduction of capital. Jones is content to admit that race is a social construction while asking us to  to believe that racism is some kind of a-priori that each subject may embrace or reject as he sees fit. What she demonstrates, in fact, is quite the opposite: that whenever our definition of race or racism (its social  construction) doesn’t fit the social norms we  simply move the cognitive goalposts; and moving  the goalposts is  how many Americans deal with racism, even today: not by  acknowledging the forms it takes, but rather by finding a way to exempt  themselves as the active subject of conscious racial behavior, leaving aside their role as  passive tools of social norms. There are those  (they are many) who believe they can be dispensed from the charge of racism because the idea of race never comes up in their discourse or behavior; others seize on hegemonic discourse in order to claim exemption from the charge of hegemonic behavior: "blacks can't be racists because yadda yadda;" "liberals can't be racist because blahblahblah." This is how we participate, most of us, in the marginalization of people of color—what is commonly called racism; but after all it was the custom for the Emperor of China to turn those Palace dogs who could not be house-broken into slippers: If the Fu shits, wear it.
James Jackson Jiveass
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WOID XXI-02
CAN WE ALL GET ALONG?